What we knew and when

Eleanor Hill, the staff director of the congressional inquiry into the Sept. 11 attacks, released a 30-page report Wednesday that details numerous previously classified terrorist threats collected by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials.

The report lays out a number of signals that terrorists were considering using aircraft as weapons and various hints that a large terrorist operation was being planned in the United States.

Evidence that terrorists were considering using planes as weapons:

DECEMBER 1994: Algerian terrorists hijacked an Air France airliner and threatened to fly it into the Eiffel Tower. French commandos stormed the plane and killed the terrorists.

JANUARY 1995: Philippines police raided a Manila apartment and found materials that suggested a plot to crash a hijacked plane into CIA headquarters near Washington. One plotter was Ramzi Yousef, who was later convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Another was Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, whom U.S. officials believe masterminded the Sept. 11 attacks.

JANUARY 1996: U.S. intelligence received reports of a planned suicide attack by associates of terrorists, including an al-Qaida operative, that would consist of flying a plane from Afghanistan to attack the White House.

1997: The FBI and CIA received reports that a terrorist group had bought a remote-control plane that could be used to crash into a building.

AUGUST 1998: U.S. intelligence learned that a group of Arabs planned to fly an explosives-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. The information was passed to the FBI and Federal Aviation Administration. The FBI took no action; the FAA found the plot "highly unlikely."

SEPTEMBER 1998: U.S. intelligence learned that Osama bin Laden's next operation could involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport. The information was supplied to senior government officials in late 1998.

FALL 1998: U.S. intelligence received reports of a bin Laden plot involving aircraft in the New York and Washington areas.

FEBRUARY 1999: U.S. intelligence received reports that Iraq had formed a suicide pilot unit to use against U.S. and British forces in the Persian Gulf. The CIA considered the report disinformation.

MARCH 1999: U.S. intelligence received reports of an American al-Qaida member who was planning to fly an explosives-laden hang glider into the Egyptian presidential palace.

APRIL 2000: A walk-in at FBI's Newark, N.J., office said he was supposed to meet five or six people in the United States to hijack a plane and fly it to Afghanistan or blow it up. The man said he had been trained in a camp in Pakistan. He passed an FBI polygraph, but the FBI was unable to verify his story.

APRIL 2001: A U.S. intelligence source with terrorist connections speculated that bin Laden would be interested in commercial pilots as terrorists. The source was offering speculation rather than specific knowledge, U.S. intelligence officials say.

AUGUST 2001: U.S. intelligence learned of a plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. Two people, reportedly acting on instruction from bin Laden, met in October 2000 to discuss the plot.

Evidence that a large terrorist attack was in the works in the spring and summer of 2001:

MARCH 2001: An intelligence source claimed bin Laden operatives were planning a strike in the following month.

APRIL 2001: U.S. intelligence received reports of a terrorist plot in New York and California.

MAY-JULY 2001: The National Security Agency received at least 33 communications suggesting a terrorist attack was imminent. None provided specific information on locations, dates or methods.

MAY 2001: U.S. intelligence received reports that al-Qaida operatives were planning to enter the United States from Canada to conduct bombings.

MAY 2001: The Pentagon learned that seven bin Laden associates had departed various places for Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

JULY 2001: A U.S. intelligence source reported that numerous people in Afghanistan were "talking about an impending attack."

AUG. 16, 2001: The Immigration and Naturalization Service detains Zacarias Moussaoui, who was attending flight school in Minnesota. He was later accused of ties to the Sept. 11 hijackers.

AUG. 23, 2001: The CIA, acting on old information about a terrorist meeting in Malaysia, asks that two eventual Sept. 11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, be put on the State Department's watch list for denying visas. But they were in the United States, and an FBI manhunt did not turn them up.

LATE SUMMER 2001: The CIA learned that an al-Qaida operative was considering mounting terrorist operations in the United States. No specifics were provided.

SEPT. 10, 2001: The NSA intercepts two communications suggesting terrorist attacks are imminent, but no specific information is provided. These are not translated until Sept. 12, however.

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