Opinion: We'll win the war, but it won't be easy

It's no secret: The Second Gulf War is not going as well as Gulf War I did. In 1991 American forces stormed into Kuwait with both strategic and tactical surprise, crossing the border with heavy armor from the far west after the "Hail Mary" lateral movement. The Marines, who rehearsed and re-rehearsed an amphibious landing in full view of the Iraqi defenders were, in the end, relegated to more conventional involvement. In less than 100 hours of ground combat, Iraq's armed forces were surrendering by the tens of thousands.

That isn't happening in 2003. The only tactical surprise up President Bush's sleeve seems to have been pulling the trigger prematurely to pursue a "target of opportunity," followed by a hasty launch of American ground forces. In all other respects, Saddam Hussein has known roughly where U.S. forces would have to operate, and once the bombing of Baghdad took place, he and his key lieutenants surely knew that U.S. forces would start north out of Kuwait within hours of the attack.

In a war of mobility, the attacking forces flow around strong points, divide slightly and then recombine like water in a rocky streambed. Basra was bypassed initially because there seemed to be resistance in Iraq's second city. Although Americans had been led to believe that the Shiites of Southern Iraq would welcome us as liberators with American flags waving, the going is so tough that British troops have turned to attack Basra in force, prepared for urban warfare. Even Um Qasr, said to have been taken on the first day of fighting, took days to conquer; the northern end of the Persian Gulf has been mined, slowing down any ship-borne resupply of, for example, the heavy weapons that could not be used from Turkey and humanitarian relief for the Iraqis.

Most disturbing of all are the fedayeen troops, irregulars dressed in civilian clothes, who have been ambushing and harassing our troops as they advance on Baghdad. American supply lines and lines of communication reach back to Kuwait; from base to fighting front the line extends 350 long and exposed miles over two-lane highways.

Tanks can cross the open desert; fuel tank trucks cannot do so easily or safely. We know that fedayeen are on the attack; the Iraqi Republican Guard division moving south from Baghdad may cut or interrupt the long support tail. All they need do is ignite a few fuel tankers, block the highway, and strangle the American spearhead within a short time.

The United States ran into a very similar problem in World War II.

Field Marshall Montgomery's ill-fated "Operation Market-Garden" used American and British airborne troops -- from the U.S. side the same 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions now in Kuwait and Iraq -- to assault three bridges across Holland. The goal then was to smash through the Netherlands and turn the corner into Germany ending the war in only two months.

Market-Garden ended in the defeat and destruction of the Allied airborne spearhead at Arnhem when armored reinforcements stalled on the road. Only one lane of the highway could be used to move forward, because the other needed to be free for command vehicles and also for ambulances and other traffic heading to the rear. The land around the road was so soft that it was unsuitable for tanks, and less suitable for fuel trucks. The option of bypassing the highway was unavailable in Holland, as it is in Iraq. The assault force in the Netherlands went "a bridge too far" for its reinforcements; given our limited combat power in Iraq, the present plan may be a city too far in its ambitions and for the price we expected to pay.

U.S. forces cannot be defeated in their attempt to conquer Baghdad -- the disparities in strength, technology, and the quality of our troops are too great. But they will be delayed, demoralized and embarrassed. And if weapons of mass destruction do not show up on the battlefield or their caches are not found by American troops, the principal legitimizing reason for the conflict will disappear.

The progress of the fighting in Iraq points up several possible miscalculations by our planners:

The Iraqi people, including the Shiites of Basra have not welcomed us as liberators, at least so far.

The "shock and awe" air campaign did not paralyze Iraqi forces and so far has not led to their wholesale surrender or their quiet abandonment of the battlefield.

Precision munitions ease the job of the infantry and armored troops, but they do not eliminate it; there is no substitute for "weight" and force on the battlefield, even in the 21st century, and even if Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would wish differently.

U.S. forces went into Iraq too lightly equipped, too quickly, and failed to take fully into account many things from blinding sandstorms to dedicated irregular and special operations forces. Our troops will win this war, but behind schedule, over budget (including the cost in blood), and without the force needed to impose peace and democracy on Iraq after a surrender. It's not the fault of our brave men and women who pay any price and bear any burden demanded by their country.

-- Peter D. Zimmerman is a Washington-based national security and arms control consultant. He was chief scientist of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He wrote this for the St. Petersburg Times.

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