The board investigating the Columbia space shuttle disaster is looking beyond the breakup itself to NASA's broader problems. What caused the shuttle to disintegrate over Texas, killing the seven-member crew Feb. 1, is the main question the board must answer. But any attempt to explain the tragedy and learn from it must include an examination of NASA's management culture and the role safety plays in manned space flight.
The investigators' leading theory is that foam debris, loosened at takeoff, struck the shuttle's left wing, piercing the edge enough to allow super-heated gases inside the wing. Sensors tracking the shuttle indicated rising temperatures on the left side in the moments before the craft broke apart. The evidence found thus far has raised legitimate questions about the shuttle's engineering, maintenance and structural integrity. Most of those relate to space flight itself. The larger question is how decisions affecting flight operations were made on the ground: What were the priorities and process that guided NASA in the Columbia era?
The chief Columbia investigator, retired Adm. Harold W. Gehman Jr., helped paint a fuller picture during his recent Senate appearance. He pointed to serious communications breakdowns within the shuttle program and a larger listlessness about safety at NASA itself. Safety backups exist on paper, he said, "but when you bore down, there is no "there' there." Engineers talked around each other, safety concerns were raised but not acted upon at the top, and erroneous information led to poor decisions. Gehman's quick command of shuttle operations and his big-picture grasp of NASA's bureaucratic flaws offer hope this process will improve flight safety.
Much of the attention has focused on the refusal by flight managers to obtain satellite photographs of the damaged orbiter, despite requests from lower-ranking engineers. The safety board also has unearthed evidence that a much longer window of opportunity existed for NASA to mount a rescue operation than agency officials first said. The chance of success for such a rescue are unclear. It's inevitable that many are looking to place blame, but it's also important, at this stage, for Congress, NASA and the safety board to remain focused on the larger issues - what went wrong, why and how to fix it.
The accident investigation board expects to issue a final report in August. The board should find a way to release the substance of more than 200 interviews with NASA personnel and contractors who were promised anonymity in exchange for their candor. However, the American people - and the Israelis, who had an astronaut aboard - deserve to hear their explanations and best judgments.
Part of the dynamic being examined by the board is the extent that private-sector contractors for NASA control the nation's space program. The goal here is to gain a broad perspective and to learn how all these elements - engineering, mechanics, communications, money, even turf wars - may have contributed to the Columbia disaster.
