Some elements of the new plans for accelerating the transfer of power to Iraqis raise concerns that the Bush administration's commitment is wavering.
Published November 16, 2003
Until last week, the Bush administration had been sticking to its story that the U.S. occupation in Iraq was succeeding nicely, despite the negative images - such as mounting American casualties and spreading anti-American sentiment - the public was receiving through the "filter" of the press. Suddenly, though, the White House appears almost panicky.
On the heels of a CIA report warning that conditions in Iraq are deteriorating, Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq, was summoned back to the White House for emergency meetings. He returned to Iraq with new plans that would dramatically accelerate the timetable for Iraqi self-governance, ready or not.
In one sense, the administration's abrupt shift in course is encouraging. It allays fears that our political and military leaders were deluding themselves about conditions in Iraq. After months of official euphemisms, Lt. Col. Ricardo Sanchez, head of coalition ground forces in Iraq, acknowledged that our troops are still involved in a "war." With U.S. troops facing dozens of attacks each day, it was impossible to maintain the official fiction that they were merely engaged in postwar "mop-up duty."
Meanwhile, Gen. John Abizaid, the leader of Central Command, is leaving MacDill for Qatar along with hundreds of his staff to oversee a more aggressive campaign against the Iraqi insurgency. Abizaid also promised to improve the inadequate intelligence that has prevented U.S. forces from identifying and locating the leaders of a guerrilla campaign that has grown more sophisticated and deadly.
The more aggressive military campaign is welcome, but plans to accelerate the transfer of power to Iraqis raise concerns that President Bush is wavering on his promise to "stay the course."
For example, it is inconceivable that Iraq could hold meaningful national elections by early next year. Even established democracies that are free of Iraq's deep religious and ethnic divisions would have trouble scheduling valid elections on such short notice. A more reasonable plan would be to speed the transfer of many responsibilities to Iraq's appointed Governing Council or a new representative body with greater credibility. Members of the current council have criticized Bremer for monopolizing powers that should be ceded to them. Now is the time to begin testing their ability to govern.
Some U.S. officials also question the wisdom of the White House's plans to reduce the number of American troops in Iraq by next spring.
"To announce withdrawals when the number of attacks and deaths of American military are going up is not reasonable or logical," said Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. "If the American military can't do it, then certainly half-trained Iraqis cannot." Gen. Abizaid agreed that the Iraqi forces being rushed into service need better training. "The police, in particular, need a lot of work," he said.
Bremer and his superiors made the disastrous decision months ago to disband the 400,000-strong Iraqi army, rather than simply purge its Baathist leaders. In addition to unnecessarily antagonizing thousands of men who were left on the streets, that decision complicated the job of rebuilding a competent Iraqi security force.
Now, U.S. authorities are under orders to speed the process of rebuilding what they recently tore down.
The decision to disband the Iraqi army was one of a series of damaging missteps stemming from wildly optimistic assumptions about the conditions our forces would face after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
Experts from the State Department, the CIA and other agencies predicted the looting, the vandalism, the guerrilla activity, the growing anti-American sentiment and other challenges, but they were closed out of Iraq planning by ideologues in the Pentagon and the vice president's office - the same people who exaggerated the threat that precipitated this war.
Our troops won the first stage of the war, but they are paying the price for their superiors' postwar miscalculations. They deserve all the time and resources required to defeat the insurgency and create the conditions for a stable Iraq. They may have to work virtually alone. The guerrillas have succeeded in running off many of the other governments and international agencies that had promised help.
Running away is not an option for the United States. President Bush, who promised again Friday that our troops "will stay . . . until the job is done," can't allow domestic political considerations to alter the timetable for finishing the job.
