Two assassination attempts against Pakistan's leader, Pervez Musharraf, raise new fears about the future of that country's role in the war against terrorism.
Published December 31, 2003
Pervez Musharraf is hardly the United States' ideal ally in the war against terrorism. The career military man, who came to power in Pakistan in a bloodless coup in 1999, is no paragon of democracy. Musharraf has made murky accommodations with leaders of his military and intelligence forces who are sympathetic to al-Qaida and other Islamic fanatics, and his government has been reluctant to curb Pakistani acts of terrorism in the disputed region of Kashmir.
For all of Musharraf's faults, though, the U.S. government is deathly afraid of what might replace him. Unfortunately, we may find out very soon. Musharraf has barely escaped two assassination attempts in recent days. Both appeared to be inside jobs, raising questions about whether Musharraf still enjoys the loyalty of Pakistan's military hierarchy, which historically has been the most stable and pro-Western institution in Pakistani society.
The most urgent security concern involving Pakistan centers on the dozens of nuclear weapons it is believed to possess. U.S. officials have worked with Pakistan over the years in an effort to build some safeguards into the control of the country's nuclear arsenal. However, Washington officials express little confidence that Pakistan's nuclear weapons would be secure if Musharraf is killed or his government collapses. The country's broader stockpiles of enriched uranium and other nuclear fuels would be even more difficult to account for.
Evidence shows that Pakistan already has sold nuclear secrets to governments such as Iran and North Korea. Musharraf's fall might increase the risk that nuclear weapons, or the ability to build them, would fall into the hands of terrorists as well.
Musharraf already has been forced to make troubling concessions to the hard-line Islamist parties that have been gaining power in Pakistan. Just before the first attempt on his life, Musharraf announced that he would step down as army chief within a year. He intends to transfer authority to a general who shares his pro-Western orientation, but political opponents, sensing Musharraf's apparent weakness, are pressing for more immediate and dramatic change. Musharraf says he plans to serve out the remaining 31/2 years of his presidential term, but the odds are that he will be out of power long before then, even if he lives to tell the tale.
Throughout Pakistan's history of political turmoil, a moderate, secular Islamic middle class has served as a source of underlying stability. That foundation is cracking. Musharraf's strategic decision to align with Washington after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks was almost universally unpopular across Pakistan. Within Musharraf's military and intelligence forces, Islamic extremists have worked to undercut efforts to root out Osama bin Laden and other terrorist leaders who have taken refuge in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If national elections were held today, anti-Western Islamic parties might well dominate the ballot.
Americans are painfully aware that our national security can be threatened when even a primitive country such as Afghanistan gives harbor to nihilistic terrorists. The prospect that Islamic radicals could gain control of a nuclear power such as Pakistan ranks at the very top of the list of threats for which our government must prepare. In the short run, Washington has to give all possible support to Musharraf and his allies. Over time, our security depends on persuading leaders in Pakistan and elsewhere to commit fully to political and economic reforms that can cleanse the poisoned ground in which terrorism breeds.
