Two inquiries have concluded that the abuses at Abu Ghraib were the result of leadership failures. The secretary of Defense should be held accountable.
Published August 28, 2004
The two reports released this week on abuses at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison cast blame further up the chain of command than any investigations before. But there is still more to be determined about the Bush administration's approval of the abuse of prisoners in Iraq and around the world - questions that were not fully answered by either investigation.
Both reports - an independent investigation headed by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and an internal Army investigation led by Maj. Gen. George Fay - properly laid the transgressions at Abu Ghraib where they belong: at the feet of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and top military commanders and intelligence officers. The reports said the real culprits weren't a handful of rogue reservist MPs, as the Bush administration has argued. Instead, our top military and civilian leaders were responsible for stunning shortcomings of training, leadership and oversight.
Schlesinger equivocated after the report's release, protecting Rumsfeld even as the report pointed to a series of leadership failures that can be traced to the defense secretary's office. Schlesinger said it would "be a boon to all of America's enemies" if Rumsfeld left office. But Rumsfeld is responsible for having created a climate of doubt over whether American forces should observe the Geneva Conventions, and for that alone he should go. According to these inquiries, Abu Ghraib was not merely a function of the thumbs-up sadism of Pfc. Lynndie England and her deranged comrades. It was a predictable consequence of an occupation conducted without adequate planning, and an arrogant leadership that approved a lowering of interrogation standards.
Confusion reigned, according to the reports, because interrogation practices kept shifting. Fay's report said interrogation policies were altered three times in less than 30 days at one point. Rumsfeld added to the muddle by approving inhumane treatment for Guantanamo prisoners, including using dogs, leaving detainees naked and exposed to extremes of hot and cold, and allowing the use of sleep deprivation and stress positions. These tactics were exported to Iraq and implicitly gave the green light to all American troops, stationed anywhere, who enjoyed inflicting pain and terror.
Neither report sufficiently reviewed serious allegations that the sexual humiliations visited upon Abu Ghraib prisoners were a purposeful tactic designed to break Arab men. Neither did they fully document whether no-holds-barred interrogations have been conducted by CIA officers and Special Operations forces operating in detention facilities around the world.
However, the Fay report did suggest that the presence of CIA officers at Abu Ghraib "eroded the necessity in the minds of soldiers and civilians for them to follow Army rules," and contributed to the brutality that ensued. According to the report, 54 military intelligence soldiers, military police officers, medics and civilian contractors committed abuses, ordered them or failed to report them.
Both reports said conditions at Abu Ghraib were allowed to deteriorate as an Iraqi insurgency caused the prison to be flooded with detainees. At one point, only 90 guards were assigned to oversee more than 7,000 prisoners. Troops were assigned to the facility with little or no training. The Schlesinger report specifically mentioned an October 2003 memorandum by the International Committee of the Red Cross that documented and detailed abuses to prisoners but was essentially ignored by U.S. authorities.
The prosecution of the seven GIs indicted for their participation at Abu Ghraib is just the beginning. Dozens of additional low-level troops are likely to face criminal charges in the coming months. But the real culpability lies at the top - all the way to Rumsfeld. He should be held accountable, as should Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the top military commander in Iraq who failed to respond to the documented leadership problems at the prison; Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, who brought some of the brutal techniques for handling prisoners from Guantanamo to Iraq; Col. Thomas Pappas, who led the intelligence brigade and authorized the use of dogs during interrogations; and many others. Otherwise, this will be viewed as a typical military response to internal wrongdoing: Let those at the bottom of the ranks take the fall.
