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Death penalty

For young sniper, no chance of death row

THE DEATH PENALTY The Supreme Court splits 5-4 in a case that takes three inmates off death row in Florida. Main story Graphic: State by state For young D.C. sniper, no chance of death row What it means to ... Pasco killer may escape death penalty Excerpts from the ruling Major rulings

Florida inmates James Bonifay, 31 Age at time of crime: 17 Crime: In Pensacola in 1991, Bonifay meant to kill a clerk at an auto parks store whom Bonifay's cousin blamed for getting him fired. But the clerk called in sick and was replaced by Billy Wayne Coker, whom Bonifay shot and killed. What ruling means: Bonifay could be eligible for parole in about 10 years, but he also was sentenced to life in prison for robbery. He will not be eligible for parole if the sentences are consecutive. If they aren't, he will be. Cleo LeCroy, 41 Age at time of crime: 17 Crime: In January 1981, LeCroy fatally shot a newlywed couple from Miami-Dade who were camping in rural Palm Beach County south of Lake Okeechobee. The bodies of John and Gail Hardeman were found about a week after they didn't return home. John Hardeman had been shot in the head; Gail Hardeman had been shot in the head, neck and chest. What ruling means: LeCroy will be eligible for parole in a few years. Nathan Ramirez, 27 Age at time of crime: 17 Crime: He killed Mildred Boroski, a 71-year-old widow, in 1995. She was in bed at her Pasco County home when Ramirez and a friend broke in. They tied her up, killed her dog and looted the house. Ramirez shot Boroski twice in the head. What ruling means: Ramirez will never be eligible for parole because his crime occurred after a 1994 law that denies parole eligibility for people convicted of first-degree murder.

McLEAN, Va. - The U.S. Supreme Court ruling Tuesday barring the execution of juvenile killers means Lee Boyd Malvo can no longer face the death penalty for his role in the 2002 Washington sniper case or other slayings around the country.

Malvo, who was 17 at the time of the shootings, has already been convicted and sentenced to life in prison without parole for two of the murders. Prosecutors had planned to try him in other jurisdictions in hopes of obtaining a death sentence.

However, Prince William County Commonwealth's Attorney Paul Ebert said that in light of the ruling, he would not pursue another conviction against Malvo.

Malvo also faced the possibility of a death sentence in Alabama and Louisiana, where he and accomplice John Allen Muhammad are accused of other slayings.

In Louisiana, East Baton Rouge District Attorney Doug Moreau said his office would still seek to prosecute Malvo for the slaying of Hong Im Ballenger, who was gunned down in Baton Rouge in the weeks before the shootings.

Alabama authorities have not decided whether to pursue charges against Malvo in the 2002 slaying of a liquor store manager in Montgomery, said Clay Crenshaw, of the Alabama Attorney General's Office.

Muhammad is already on death row in Virginia.

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined.

The objective indicia of national consensus here - the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of states; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice - provide sufficient evidence that today society views juveniles as "categorically less culpable than the average criminal." Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit "a narrow category of the most serious crimes" and whose extreme culpability makes them "the most deserving of execution." Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. Juveniles' susceptibility to immature and irresponsible behavior means their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult. Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment. The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.

The overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty is not controlling here, but provides respected and significant confirmation for the court's determination that the penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18.

Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion.

Adolescents as a class are undoubtedly less mature, and therefore less culpable for their misconduct, than adults. But the court has adduced no evidence impeaching the seemingly reasonable conclusion reached by many state legislatures: that at least some 17-year-old murderers are sufficiently mature to deserve the death penalty in an appropriate case.

An especially depraved juvenile offender may nevertheless be just as culpable as many adult offenders considered bad enough to deserve the death penalty. Similarly, the fact that the availability of the death penalty may be less likely to deter a juvenile from committing a capital crime does not imply that this threat cannot effectively deter some 17-year-olds from such an act.

Some juvenile murderers may be quite mature. Chronological age is not an unfailing measure of psychological development, and common experience suggests that many 17-year-olds are more mature than the average young "adult."

Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined.

As we have noted in prior cases, the evidence is unusually clear that the Eighth Amendment was not originally understood to prohibit capital punishment for 16- and 17-year-old offenders.

But the court having pronounced that the Eighth Amendment is an ever-changing reflection of "the evolving standards of decency" of our society, it makes no sense for the justices then to prescribe those standards rather than discern them from the practices of our people. On the evolving-standards hypothesis, the only legitimate function of this court is to identify a moral consensus of the American people. By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the nation?

Christopher Simmons, who was only seven months shy of his 18th birthday when he murdered Shirley Crook, described to his friends beforehand the murder he planned to commit. He then broke into the home of an innocent woman, bound her with duct tape and electrical wire and threw her off a bridge alive and conscious.

- TIMES STAFF, ASSOCIATED PRESS

[Last modified March 2, 2005, 04:36:40]