Lapse in power plant security is unacceptable
A Times EditorialPublished March 31, 2005
The operations of our nation's nuclear power plants involve some of the most advanced technologies ever devised by human beings. Harnessing the awesome power of atomic energy to do the bidding of mere mortals is hardly child's play.
It stands to reason, therefore, that an industry that operates at the upper reaches of technological achievement should never be laid low by the relatively mundane tasks involved in checking a visiting worker's ID badge.
Yet a recent situation at the Progress Energy complex in Crystal River demonstrates how easily the seemingly simplest of chores can become a potential danger.
A handful of men employed by a private contractor to perform maintenance work at the power plant used false identifications, including phony Social Security numbers, to get their jobs and gain access to the power plant. One of the men was working in the turbine building near the nuclear reactor.
While this scenario may sound like the plot of a B-grade spy movie, the reality was not all that menacing. The maintenance workers were never out of sight of plant escorts and all had passed through layers of security such as metal and bomb detectors.
Still, this incident must be considered a disturbing breach of security at a facility that can ill afford any such lapses. No one needs to be reminded that we live in an era of unprecedented terrorist threats and that our nation's nuclear facilities have been mentioned as potential terror targets.
Last week, in response to the Crystal River incident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a tepid advisory to nuclear facility operators calling for "a heightened level of awareness" in ensuring the proper identity of workers at their plants.
No kidding.
All indications in this case are that the workers used the phony identifications merely to gain access to paying jobs. That may not always be the true motivation of those who manage to slip past the gates and get inside of a nuclear facility. Such security oversights invite all sorts of mischief.
As worrisome as it is that this sort of a gap could exist despite all of the emphasis placed on improving security at key installations in recent years, even more troubling is that this breach was discovered not through the efforts of plant officials but because of a tip from a union at the energy complex.
Union officials have good reasons to focus on the identities and credentials of workers passing through the job site. Those in charge of security at the complex should be even more diligent.
Progress Energy officials must heed the lessons learned through this experience, and representatives have said that new security measures already have been added. With the advent of national information databases and multiagency watch lists, the technology exists to closely screen anyone setting foot on the facility.
This time, plant officials escaped with only some embarrassment. They might not always be so fortunate.