We can't end peril, but we can prepare for it

WASHINGTON -- As we learn to live with new risks and anxieties, consider these observations from people who have been thinking about terrorism since long before Sept. 11.

There is no perfect defense, and if there was, even the richest country in history couldn't afford it. We can reduce risk, but not eliminate it.

"Airplanes" and "anthrax" are only the beginning of the terrorist's catalog of options. Think "c" for cargo, "s" for smallpox and "u" for uranium.

Because we cannot block every possible attack, we must also be ready to respond to one, to save as many people as possible.

Just a block from the U.S. Capitol, newspaper editors and broadcasters gathered last week to hear from senior government officials and leading scientists about how worried we should be. It was a lot like telling grownup ghost stories around a campfire, except without the campfire.

Tom Ridge, the new director of homeland security, focused largely on preparations to help Americans in case of more terrorist attacks.

"We are engaged on two battlefields," he observed. "There is one in Afghanistan and one in this country."

But on this battlefield, where are the fronts? At the ports, where thousands of cargo containers come into the U.S. every day? At the nuclear plants, where the radioactive rods of depleted fuel are kept in storage because their designated burial ground, a mountain in Nevada, is not yet open for business? On our computer networks, where we store the operating instructions that keep modern life humming?

The scientists, coming from various backgrounds, could see the risks most clearly within their own areas of study. Nuclear physicist Richard Garwin noted that Russia still has hundreds of tons of weapons-grade uranium lying around from the Cold War and that inventory controls have slipped since the Soviet Union's demise. As if to reinforce the point, Russian television reported Thursday that police arrested seven gangsters trying to sell 2 pounds of weapons-grade uranium.

"So, that's the nuclear weapon threat, all too real in my opinion," Garwin offered brightly.

The bioterrorism expert passed around sheets comparing a veritable lineup of microscopic suspects. Anthrax is bad enough, but Dr. Margaret Hamburg worries more about smallpox. Anthrax is lethal, but not contagious. Smallpox is both.

Hamburg was public health commissioner in New York in 1993, when terrorists first set off bombs at the World Trade Center.

"We thought that was bad, but after Sept. 11, we learned (it) was really child's play," she told the editors, and she drew a parallel with the potential biological weapons: We would have a different view of anthrax once we had seen smallpox.

Public health is not a specialty where many doctors find fame or fortune, but officials and scientists from other fields described it as a vital line of defense that badly needs reinforcement. In Florida, only one man died of anthrax because professionals recognized it quickly and responded vigorously. We need more doctors and nurses who can make connections between odd cases and a system that has imagined some dreadful scenarios.

The best we can do, the experts agreed, is to improve our odds against terrorists. Even that will be difficult and expensive, and without guarantees. Anthony Cordesman, a national security expert who regularly shows up on the network news shows, referred to "actuarial" victory.

"This will be a broad war," he said. "It will take decades. There will never be an absolute victory, and there will always be gaps in defenses."

To reduce some risks and accept others, we have to understand them. To play the odds, we have to know them, and know what the worst case might be. Some readers may object that respected scientists would openly speculate about terrorist threats and possible defenses. Doesn't such discussion help point the bad guys toward more trouble?

William Wulf, the president of the National Academy of Engineering, says such fears are naive.

"There's very little that we could discuss that they haven't already thought of," Wulf said. "Simply by trying to hide a problem, you do not create security."

Put it this way: Before Sept. 11, the people who realized how easy it would be to hijack airplanes and turn them into suicide missiles were the people who would do it -- not the people who might have stopped them.

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